

**Genocide, State Terrorism and “Development:”  
Canadian Intellectuals’ Responsibility in the Fate of the  
East Timorese and the Palestinians**

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The history of the idea of a “profession” reveals that it was originally associated with the religious professing or confessing of one’s spiritual commitment. Gradually, as it became secularized, the emphasis shifted more and more to professional skills and techniques. The pre-modern image of profession as advocacy based on faith gave way to the modern image of technique devoid of advocacy. What we need is a post-modern model of professions that would include both knowledge and skill on the one hand and specific advocacies and ethical commitments on the other...

One important lesson is that the Nazi doctors that I interviewed were all ordinary people. They teach us that it is possible for ordinary men and women who are not inherently demonic to engage in demonic pursuits - for healers to become killers. And it can be said that among the Nazis, teachers and other professionals with pride in their professions, lent themselves to mass murder. The majority of teachers in the universities in Nazi Germany did not actively take part in mass murder, but they accommodated themselves and went along, or sat back and did nothing to prevent it (Lifton, 1987: 66, 139).

### **The problem of intellectuals’ responsibility**

I can tell you about my problem like this. On November 13, 1991 the *Globe and Mail* ran a story with the following headline:

East Timor troops fire on demonstrators

This excited my interest in two apparently unrelated ways.<sup>11</sup> For an ethnomethodologist pursuing studies in membership categorization analysis (MCA) (Eglin and Hester, 1992) with particular attention to news headlines (Eglin, forthcoming), here was another case with possibly interesting features. Under the terms of MCA one might notice right off that the headline comprises two MC formulations “East Timor troops” and “demonstrators” and one action descriptor “fire on.” Sentences with similar “surface structures” had been studied by John Lee (1984) – “Girl guide, 14, raped at Hell’s Angels convention” - where, he argued, readers may be having recourse to a membership categorization device (MCD) comprising the pair of categories “innocent victim” and “evil-doer,” and by Lena Jayyusi (1984) in *Categorization and the Moral Order*. The possibility suggested itself that the way I was reading this headline might depend on some pairing of “East Timor troops” and “demonstrators.” Furthermore, my reading of “fire on” might arise from some category-tied relationship I was invoking between the category “troops,” the action “fire on” and, indeed, the category “demonstrators.” Similar ideas were being developed by Stephen Hester in the course of his analysis of “Mother charged in death of child” (Hester and Eglin, 1992: 117-128). Moreover,

Headlines ... may be read to make news. They may attain newsworthiness by announcing that something we need to know is contained in the subsequent text; by announcing a continuation or

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### **<sup>1</sup>Endnotes**

1. The opening discussion of “East Timor troops ...” is taken from a longer, different paper first presented at the Cultural Sciences Symposium, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, on February 21, 1994 (Eglin, 1994).

conclusion to something we are already interested in or by announcing that something extraordinary has happened. There is a sense in which “Boy, 16, swims the Channel” .... is about the unlikely achievement of a difficult task.... **Formally the newsworthy elements .... are the unlikely nature of the actor for the act....** The essence of this particular newsworthiness resides in its outstanding mentionability (Anderson and Sharrock, 1979: 380-381, emphasis added).

What I particularly took from this was the point in emphasis. However, I wished to abstract from the narrow criterion of “unlikelihood,” which Anderson and Sharrock propose describes the relationship between the actor and the act in this recognizably newsworthy headline, to the broader criterion of “inappropriateness.” In the case at hand this amounts to arguing that in addition to using interpretive procedures for making conventional “conceptual-grammatical” connections between membership categories and category-related predicates, readers exploit their procedural knowledge for finding newsworthy stories in headlines to see that, while state authorities might seek to use various legitimate methods of crowd control to manage political demonstrations, shooting at demonstrators is inappropriate. But since this would be an event worth reporting in the news, it must indeed be the story to be found in the words of this headline. Whereas the Chomskian reader equipped with a grammatical knowledge of the language and a good dictionary could not rule out the possibility that these words mean that the military personnel of East Timor hotly encouraged - inflamed - some appliance salespersons (in some marketing enterprise), the competent reader finds not “merely theoretical” connections between

actor categories and action-descriptors but newsworthy ones. Finding them he knows what the story is that is being told here. This account gives you some idea of one way this headline had and still has interest for me. But it would be wrong to say that this problematic provided the *first* avenue for my interest. That comes from quite a different place.

From this other place what struck my interest - well, no, that would be the wrong phrase - what incensed me was not just the assault itself - another massacre in a (to then) sixteen-year genocidal assault on the Timorese - but the lie (Chomsky, 1987b) contained in the words “East Timor troops.” For there are East Timor troops only in the sense in which there are, say, Ontario troops. That is, it would be as wrong to describe Indonesian troops in East Timor as East Timor troops as it would be to describe Canadian troops in Ontario as Ontario troops. But the lie has a deeper level. To describe Indonesian troops stationed in East Timor as (possibly) East Timor troops is to accept that East Timor is a province of Indonesia (as Ontario is a province of Canada). But to do so would be equivalent to describing Iraqi troops in the Iraqi-annexed “province” of Kuwait as Kuwaiti troops. That would be wrong, not to say morally grotesque, for the obvious reason that despite Iraq having invaded, occupied and annexed Kuwait as Iraq’s twentieth province this was clearly contrary to international law, and was immediately condemned by the United Nations as a blatant case of aggression (despite Iraq’s possibly arguable claims to Kuwait). Moreover, Kuwaiti troops (and civilians) were actively opposing Iraq’s invasion and being killed for their pains. Similarly, it would be wrong, not to say morally grotesque, to describe Indonesian troops as East Timor troops for the obvious reason that despite Indonesia having invaded, occupied and annexed East Timor as its twenty-seventh province, this was clearly contrary to international law and was immediately condemned by the United Nations

as a criminal act of military intervention (and Indonesia had NO claims to East Timor). Moreover, not only were many of the troops of self-declared independent East Timor killed by the troops of Indonesia, but an estimated two hundred thousand of the pre-invasion population of 700,000 have died since, especially in the period 1975 to 1979. Resistance from the guerrilla troops of East Timor was continuing at the time of the 1991 massacre, and continues today (Briere and Devaney, 1991, 1990; Budiardjo, 1991; Budiardjo and Liong, 1984; Chomsky, 1993a: Chp 5; 1987a; 1982; Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Taylor, 1991).

It would, of course, be “right” to describe Indonesian troops firing on East Timorese demonstrators as “East Timor troops” if you accepted the Indonesian propaganda line as follows. Indonesia was invited by patriotic East Timorese groups to intervene in a civil war in East Timor. It did so, restored peace, and in an “Act of Integration” of May 31, 1976 (Taylor, 1991: 73-74) accepted the collective decision of the East Timorese people to be incorporated into Indonesia. There is clear, although not unqualified, evidence in the text of the AP article from Jakarta that that is precisely the point of view informing the news report: for example, one essential feature of the Indonesian propaganda version of history is embodied in the clause, “since Indonesia sent troops to intervene in a civil war in East Timor,” found towards the end of the article.

### **Canada, Indonesia and East Timor**

At this point the question may reasonably be put: what is the relevance of all this to the presumed interests of the Canadian Association for Studies in Development?

Let me note first that the Nov 13, 1991 *Globe* article is not an “isolated case” (Eglin, 1990). On June 2, 1994 at least one (but not all) editions(s) of *The Globe and Mail* carried a

“News Briefing” story entitled “Indonesia accused of genocide.” The accuser was Sharon Scharfe (M.A. Legal Studies, Carleton), an ETAN activist and co-author and co-presenter of a related paper to be given tomorrow at a joint CLSA/CSAA session on State Terrorism (Eglin *et al*, 1994). She made the accusation at an international conference on East Timor in Manila in the face of a deportation order brought by the Government of the Philippines made in response to threats and pressure from the Government of Indonesia desperate to prevent non-Filipinos (i.e., Timorese) from attending and putting out a message not approved by Burson and Marsteller. Since the Nov 13, 1991 article the *Globe* had itself published a few articles about East Timor including an excellent piece by Linda Hossie (April 4, 1992) exposing the Canada-Indonesia linkage. What is telling, then, is that despite the *Globe’s* recent enlightenment about East Timor it could nevertheless let pass (again) another AP story with the same old tired Indonesian propaganda version of history (see above):

Indonesia annexed the Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1976, after intervening in a civil war, and has insisted that the East Timorese people favoured integration with Indonesia.

While the next, and final, paragraph states,

The United Nations, however, still recognizes Portugal as the territory's administering power and human-right activists have accused Indonesia of widespread abuses in East Timor,

it hardly undoes the perversion of history accomplished by the one before.

Second, it’s not just *The Globe and Mail*. Consider the following paragraphs:

**December 7, 1975**

Dili is retaken from FRETILIN forces, and days later Provisional Government of East Timor is proclaimed. Four months of bloodshed are ended.

**May 31, 1976**

The elected People's Assembly votes to request integration of the territory into the Republic of Indonesia.

**1976-1979**

Period of emergency assistance to refugees from civil war, establishment of administrative structures and inauguration of economic development and social welfare programs throughout the province.

Well, lies like this are perhaps laughable, and are (I hope) easily recognizable as the vile government propaganda they are; these are extracts from "An East Timor Chronology," part of a publication of the Republic of Indonesia (1992) entitled *East Timor: Building the Future*. But then, thirdly, who wrote the following?

**BACKGROUND ON EAST TIMOR**

For the four hundred years preceding 1975, East Timor existed as a Portuguese colony. In that year, Indonesia filled the vacuum created by the departure of the European administration. East Timor was incorporated as Indonesia's twenty-seventh province in 1976 by which time a strong military presence had been established. Conflict between the Indonesian army and the East



Timorese independence movement, FRETILIN, severely disrupted life in the region for the next half decade.

The international community tolerated these events with unease. Debate within the United Nations never yielded a concise, unanimous response to the issue.

Although some improvement had occurred in East Timor since 1981, matters regressed suddenly in late 1991 when Indonesian soldiers opened fire on a funeral procession in the capital city, Dili. Condemnation from the international community followed swiftly. Canada, in particular, suspended the approval of three new development projects in Indonesia totalling some \$30 million. This suspension remains in effect to date. In addition, Canada immediately granted \$150,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross for humanitarian assistance in the region.

Concerns still remain about human rights abuses in Indonesia and in East Timor, in particular.

This is clearly not stuff of the same order as the preceding Government of Indonesia version of history. No, it's rather worse. It lacks the courage to lie with abandon, settling rather for weasel lies, half-truths, deceptions and economies with the truth. In so doing it plays a role akin to that of the "good Germans," particularly the academic sort who gave themselves to the task of not only not seeing what was going on in front of their eyes, but who supplied the horror with an

agreeable cover story. Indonesia, the genocidal aggressor, and Canada the complicit supporter, are written out of history, while Canada the humanitarian bringer of aid for the needy is written in. This is the Government of Canada talking in a CIDA publication called *CIDA in East Timor* (CIDA, 1993a).

The document is one of a package of materials External Affairs and International Trade will send you if you enquire about Canada's relations with Indonesia and East Timor, as my colleague Jeff Klaehn did in this case. The rest are about Indonesia, with the emphasis on trade and aid.

Another CIDA document, *CIDA Programs in Asia: Indonesia* (CIDA, 1993b), is distinguished by a map of Indonesia on page four in which East Timor is shown as part of Indonesia. Thus does Canada honour its commitments to the United Nations and its ten resolutions on East Timor, the non-self-governing territory administered by Portugal and illegally occupied by Indonesia.

Fourthly, one can learn from the government documents that from 1988 to 1991 Indonesia was the second largest recipient of Canada's bilateral (that is, government-to-government) aid and is currently in third place, that Canadian aid runs at about \$40 million annually, that the suspension of \$30 million in *future* aid projects following the Santa Cruz massacre has not affected this at all, that "Indonesia is Canada's largest export market in Southeast Asia," that Canada's two-way trade with Indonesia "increased by 47 percent in 1992 and is expected to grow at approximately 10 percent per year through this decade," that "total trade should exceed \$1 billion in 1994" (External Affairs Canada, n.d.), that Canadian companies have at least three billion dollars invested in Indonesia, and so on. Furthermore, while the *Globe*

is providing a mouthpiece for Indonesian propaganda in a nevertheless tiny item on East Timor in the column of “News Briefings,” it is also running a series of large articles by John Stackhouse on “development” in Asia, in which Indonesia is prominently featured. There is Pacific Rim fever, as there is NAFTA fever. In East Timor as in Indonesia itself, as in Mexico, as in China, as in Haiti, popular resistance must be crushed so that profits may flow.

A further lesson the documents teach is that a significant portion of Canada’s aid goes to projects run by Canadian universities. Canadian academics are heavily involved in Indonesian “development,” and have been since before the invasion of 1975. I have found no indication that nineteen years of ongoing near-genocide by Indonesia in East Timor has seriously affected this involvement. I know that McMaster University and the University of Toronto (under Meyer Brownstone’s influence?) ended such involvement, and if there are other cases I would be glad to hear of them. The large SFU and Guelph projects continue, although thanks to the belligerence of John McMurtry (and a strong student-activist group) the Guelph project has been put to external review on ethical grounds. I believe the reviewers’ report languishes somewhere in the University of Guelph administration. The argument is made by liberal pragmatists like Chris Dagg - (former?) Project Director, Eastern Indonesia Development Project at Simon Fraser University, former employee of P.T. INCO Indonesia, former regional advisor and manager of Guelph University’s Sulawesi Regional Development Project - and his employer of 18 years (thirteen of them (1971-1984) as First Secretary at the Canadian Embassy in Indonesia), the Department of Foreign Affairs (and International Trade), that preserving a relationship with killer states like Indonesia allows the “good guys” to exercise leverage on the “bad guys” over such matters as human rights (Dagg, 1993). It’s an astonishing claim to hear otherwise intelligent

people make. The evidence is, surely, that appeasing and supporting killers encourages them in their killing. Chomsky and Herman have observed many times, and with enormous documentation - drawing particularly on the work of Lars Schoultz - that there is a strong correlation between US aid and state terror in the “aided” state. This holds for Indonesia, and it holds in the Canadian case (McMurtry, 1990). You can hardly support the terrorist state at the UN, develop programs of co-operation with it, arm it (see Appendix One), trade with it, invest in it and invite “17 Indonesian senior civil servants” (CIDA 1993b: 22) to dine at the President’s House on campus (University of Guelph in November, 1992), and then take its representative aside and quietly say, “by the way, what you’re up to in Timor Timur is not on,” and expect to be taken seriously.

Finally in this section we may note that in a 1993 Special Issue of the *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* devoted to Indonesia, Part Two of which is edited by Harry Cummings of the University of Guelph (and former Director of the Sulawesi Regional Development Project), a map of Indonesia is provided at the very beginning in which the whole island of Timor is shown as part of Indonesia (see Appendix Two). There is no boundary drawn between East and West Timor, and over the eastern part of the island is found the number “27,” marking the (illegally claimed) status of East Timor as Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province.

Government agency, national newspaper and academic “development” establishment - the circle is complete. One does not need to invoke a criminal conspiracy when the elements do it all by themselves.



## **Canada, Israel and the Palestinians**

A similar story can be told for the case of Canada's relationship with Israel over the forty-odd years of its oppression of the Palestinian people. But here I must acknowledge a considerable ignorance of the details of the political, economic and social history of Canada's relationship with the Middle East. While I have been reading Tareq Ismael's new book, *Canada and the Middle East*, in an effort to become better informed, what I have to say is pretty bald, is said here without proper documentation (though documentation abounds), and is provided very much as a second case to support the themes of the first and more substantial Indonesian case.

Let me note some gross parallels between the two cases (without pretending that there are not significant differences) - first, a list of Israel's actions and the ensuing U.N. resolutions, then Canada's response. The quoted information in points (1)-(4) is taken from Norman Finkelstein, "Double standards in the Gulf" (1990; see also Chomsky, 1990).

(1) Israel carried out acts of aggression, including invasion, against its neighbours that were recognized and condemned as such by the United Nations: "in the past 15 years, the Security Council has adopted fully 15 resolutions condemning Israeli aggression against Lebanon and other Arab countries. Four more such resolutions were vetoed by a lone U.S. vote."

(2) Israel illegally annexed territory: "in August 1980, the Security Council declared Israel's annexation of Jerusalem 'null and void' under international law and, in December 1981, declared Israel's annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights 'null and void' under international law ... The General Assembly has also repeatedly condemned the ... Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (a December 1988 resolution was supported by 149 countries with only Israel casting a negative vote)."

(3) Israel illegally occupied territory: “fully three Security Council resolutions have demanded Israel’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon ... The General Assembly has repeatedly deplored the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza ... and urged a two-state settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under the auspices of an international peace conference (a December 1989 resolution was supported by 151 countries with only the U.S., Israel, and Dominica casting negative votes).”

(4) Israel has committed grievous human rights violations against the Palestinians over many, many years. These violations have been documented at length and repeatedly by all the major human rights organizations; torture, for example, has been recorded since 1977 [see Cockburn]. The U.N. has repeatedly condemned Israel’s human rights practices including its deportation of Palestinians, its “refusal to recognize the applicability of the Geneva Conventions in the occupied territories,” its forcible removal and resettlement of Palestinian refugees living in the occupied territories, its ““arbitrary detention and imprisonment of thousands of Palestinians”” and its ““continued massacre’ of Palestinian civilians ... (an October 1988 resolution was supported by 141 countries with only the U.S. and Israel casting negative votes).”

(5) Israel has been accused of war crimes [see Moynihan, in Laqueur and Rubin]. We will come to the case of Canada Park below.

(6) The U.N. resolutions have not been enforced.

(7) The oppressed population has resisted fiercely.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>. On the nature of the recent agreement between Israel and the PLO see Said (1993).

(8) The unilateral declaration of independence by the Palestine National Council in 1988 was not taken seriously.

What part has Canada played in these events and decisions?

(a) Canada was an enthusiastic participant in and supporter of the 1947 plan to partition Palestine between a Jewish state and an Arab state. Pearson was lauded by Canadian Zionists for his part in formulating a plan that Zionists generally enthusiastically supported, that the U.S. backed, but which “was bitterly opposed by both the Arab majority within Palestine and by the neighbouring Arab states” (Ismael, 1994: 11). Acceptance of the plan by the General Assembly led to civil war then to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 has several ramifications. First, Israel approximately doubled the size of its territory allotted to her in the partition plan; secondly, the Palestinian state, which the partition plan provided for the Palestinian Arab population, never came into existence: the territory of this proposed state that was not seized by Israel during the war was awarded by the UN to the neighbouring Jordanian state; thirdly, Israel demonstrated her overwhelming military superiority vis-a-vis the combined power of the neighbouring Arab states; and finally, as a consequence of the war, nearly one million Palestinian Arabs became homeless refugees dependent upon world philanthropy (Ismael, 1994: 12).

“Canada, as a member of the Security Council ... urged the adoption of a ‘pragmatic’ position by the United Nations” (12), namely to accept the status quo with “a settlement on the basis of the



*de facto* boundaries” (12). Thus, while Canada went on to build that humanitarian “custodial” role for which it is noted, namely to keep the peace and keep refugees alive, it acceded to, indeed supported, the fundamental crime at the heart of the “Question of Palestine.” Its *de facto* acceptance of the annexation and “integration” of East Timor into Indonesia is hardly surprising in this context.

(b) Canada’s part in the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt then withdrew after virtually universal censure, was to have been arming both sides in the interest of balance; but believing Israel to be the weaker party, Canada gave her more. “After the conclusion of the Czech arms deal, which the Egyptians perceived as a defensive measure, Canada granted an export permit for twenty-five F-86 jets to Israel at America’s request. However, this shipment was cancelled when Israel proved itself, in October 1956, capable of offensive action” (Ismael, 1994: 16). (Canada’s more recent arms sales to Israel can be seen in Appendix Three.) The issue came to the U.N.. “The first resolution adopted by the Assembly called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of forces, and was sponsored by the United States. Sixty-four delegations voted in favour; Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel voted against; Canada abstained” (Ismael, 1994: 17). Canada sought to compromise (between the U.S. and Britain) on aggression, as it did again in 1975/76 on East Timor.

(c) However, in apparent contrast to its abstention on, opposition to, or failure to support the UN resolutions on East Timor (notably Security Council Resolutions (SCR) 384 and 389), Canada actually helped to formulate SCR 242 in response to the 1967 Arab-Israeli six-day war. Indeed, “it has become the basis of Canadian policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Essentially, the main text of SCR 242 affirms ‘withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories of recent conflict,’

‘termination of all claims or states of belligerency,’ and ‘a just settlement of the refugee problem’” (Ismael, 1994: 15). It also calls “for a political settlement, freedom of navigation, and the recognition of secure and recognized boundaries” (Ismael, 1994: 22).

The official Canadian position on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories was ... to tie it to the settlement of other issues, a position similar to that of the United States and one favoured by Israel (Ismael, 1994: 23).

Since, however, Israel did not want to settle the matter of “secure and recognized boundaries,” having no doubt aggrandizement of territory in mind, Canada’s support for 242 has been essentially ineffectual. Terrorizing and impoverishment of the indigenous (Palestinian Arab) population have been allowed to continue - part of “a 50-year long effort to crush the Palestinians and absorb their lands” (Herman, 1994: 6). Once again, the parallel with East Timor is fairly plain.

(d) Following the six-day war Israel blew up three Palestinian villages - Beit Nuba, Yalu and Imwas - and erected “Canada Park, a 7,500-acre recreational area covered with pine forests” on the sites of the bulldozed Palestinian homes. “Montreal and Toronto Jewish philanthropists ... in 1972 donated more than \$15 million to help build it” while many Palestinians became homeless as a result of the project (Dirlik, 1991; Ismael, 1994: 10; see the 1991 Fifth Estate documentary).

Canada has offered Israel an estimated \$100 million in export credits to help it settle Soviet and Ethiopian refugees over the next five years. The offer was made through Canada’s Export

Development Corporation, a crown corporation that will lend money to Israel so it can buy pre-fab housing from Canadian manufacturers (Dirlik, 1991).

These Canadian actions surely qualify as “aiding and abetting” a war crime, to quote the language of the Canadian Criminal Code.

(e) Canada opposes Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the bits remaining to Palestinians after the failure of the Partition Plan), yet is unwilling “to contemplate actions that would register Ottawa’s seriousness to the Israelis” (Ismael, 1994: 34). Canada claims to support the legitimate rights of the Palestinians but “stood alone among the 41 states at the Francophone Summit in Quebec [in 1987] in rejecting Palestinian statehood” (Ismael, 1994: 35). Canada supports the view that Palestinians should represent themselves at any negotiations but won’t recognize the PLO “as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” This is so despite the U.N. recognition of the PLO since 1974, and that of 128 other countries (Ismael, 1994: 43). Canada, with Israel, the United States and Australia, voted against a major U.N. resolution of 1983 seeking a negotiated solution but containing the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and equal footing for the PLO in an international conference.

Thus, while Canada appears to be making calls for Palestinian participation in negotiations and claims to support the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, it also seems to be denying them this right when the PLO is advanced as their representative, and when the rights themselves are spelled out (Ismael, 1994: 45).

(f) On March 10, 1988 Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark denounced the brutality with which Israel sought to suppress the *intifada*, begun in 1987. Yet when in the same year the Palestine National Council declared the independence of a Palestinian state, Canada refused to recognize it. When the PLO accepted 242 (and 338) in the same year, Canada responded ambiguously to the recognition of the PLO.

(g) According to Ismael, since at least 1948 the Canadian press, notably *The Globe and Mail* has been pro-Israeli. When Clark spoke out about Israeli human rights violations “the Zionist-dominated media attempted to ridicule Canada for its principled stand” (Ismael, 1994: 51). Naylor (1983) and Eglin (1992) confirm this pro-Israeli and anti-Arab stance for the CBC and *The Globe and Mail* respectively in recent years. The bias of the U.S. media is well-established (Said, 1981; Chomsky, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1993b):

In the occupied territories, officially authorized beatings, large scale administrative detentions, the destruction of thousands of homes and numerous orchards, and systematic torture, have been almost entirely ignored ...

The more than one thousand killings of *intifada* protesters have been reported on the back pages as impersonal happenings like traffic death numbers. The violations of UN resolutions and international law on occupation policies have been almost entirely ignored ... (Herman, 1994: 6).

## **Conclusion**

Ismael sub-titles his work “The Foreign Policy of a Client State,” referring to Canada’s relationship to the United States. He argues that the loss of independence and the adoption of a client role in the matter of Canada’s relationship with the Middle East really got under way in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, and came to fruition with Canada’s participation as a belligerent in the Gulf War of 1991. Any pretension to an independent peacekeeping role in the Middle East was lost with that submission to American design. Following the U.S. line was evident with respect to East Timor from 1975. As he says, Canada gave up an independent political role to concentrate on “economic and social questions,” questions, that is, of “development.” “Development” is a very Canadian concept. It’s polite, industrious, almost Methodist, and vaguely progressive. It sounds good. I’m sure it has been deconstructed often enough. My take on it is that it is an ideological device in a liberal-pragmatist tool-kit that can be used to keep profits flowing to the good ol’ boys, by seducing good men and women to put a good face on a set of interests that, as Chomsky says, do not treat human beings as ends but only as means. Disposable means. We are intellectual collaborators in too many deaths (Said and Hitchens, 1988). It’s got to stop.

So I return to the beginning. I find that I cannot justify using this headline to teach students about membership categorization analysis (nor can I discuss the suicide rates among the Native Peoples as examples of the problems of the reliability and validity of official statistics) unless I locate the inquiry in terms of a critique of propaganda in *The Globe and Mail*, a critique designed not in the general interest of illustrating *such* things but of bringing *The Globe and Mail* to account in the interest of minimizing the avoidable suffering of the East Timorese (Eglin *et al*, 1994). The point may be extended to cover the necessity of a critique of academic intellectuals’

responsibility in this whole area. The practical ramifications of this position may be imagined. It was, after all, the sociologist Daniel Patrick Moynihan who, as United States Ambassador to the United Nations at the time of the U.S.-and-Canadian-backed-and-supported Indonesian invasion of East Timor, described his own role as follows:

“The United States wished things to turn out as they did ... and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.” Moynihan was well aware of how things turned out, noting that within a few weeks some 60,000 people had been killed, “10 percent of the population, almost the proportion of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during the Second World War.” Thus he took credit for achievements that he compares to the Nazis (Chomsky, 1993a: 133-134, citing his own *Towards a New Cold War* in which he cites Moynihan’s autobiography).

And, since my own form of life is related to the taxes (presumably) paid to the Canadian Government by the domestic branches of the over 300 Canadian companies doing business in Indonesia to the tune of about \$3 billion in investment with the help of export-development programs and Canadian Government Overseas Development Assistance to Indonesia of approximately \$40 million per year, itself made possible by seventeen years (1975-1992) of Canadian diplomatic support for Indonesia at the U.N., and by fifteen years (1976-1991) of

virtual silence by the Canadian mass media (see Appendix Four) regarding the East Timor genocide (Eglin *et al*, 1994), then if I uphold the lessons my discipline teaches me about **cost**, and if the values of the university **matter** to me, how can I do other than put first the practical task of securing real self-determination for the Timorese and Palestinians, and bringing my fellow Canadian intellectuals and myself to account?

## Appendix One

### Official Canadian Military Exports to Indonesia 1979-1992

DATE	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT (\$)
1979	Annual Total	52,648
1980	Annual Total	52,505
1981	Annual Total	246,770
1982	Annual Total	1,320,495
1983	Annual Total	1,264,462
1984	Annual Total	814,751
1985	Annual Total	545,401
1986	Annual Total	300,833
1987	Annual Total	1,100,000
1988	Nothing Reported	--
1989	EOD Body Armour Type V	100,866
1990	Nothing Reported	--
1991	Electronic Equipment for Military Use, Computers and Software	27,963
1992	Aircraft, Helicopters, Unmanned Airborne Vehicles	3,000

Note: "Official" figures, government-defined, have been publicly reported by Foreign (External) Affairs since 1990; in 1988 and 1989 they were publicly released; information from 1977-1988 was obtained by Access to Information requests.

Source: Canadian Military Industry Database Report, June 7, 1994, Project Ploughshares, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario.



### Discovered Details of Canadian Military Exports to Indonesia

DATE	COMPANY	DESCRIPTION OF CONTRACT	AMOUNT (\$)
1981	Valcartier Industries (Que.)	Ammunition	?
1982	Levy Auto Parts Co. (Ont.)	Military Vehicles	?
	Irvin Inds. Canada Ltd. (Ont.)	Parachutes	?
1985	Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc. (Que.)	13 PT6T-3B twinned turbo-shaft engines for Bell 412 helicopters	10,000,000
	Valcom Ltd. (Ont.)	10-kilowatt HF coupler systems	?
1986	Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc. (Que.)	PT6T-3B turboshaft engines for Bell 412 helicopters	10,000,000
1989	Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Ont.)	Navigation system for Air Force	?
1991	Litton Systems Canada Ltd. (Ont.)	APS-504(V)5 radar for CN-235 MPA flying testbed (subc)	?

Note: “Discovered” details were found in news media reports and other secondary sources; exceptions are the sales of Pratt & Whitney helicopter engines announced in a Government press release; the figures are larger than the “officially” reported amounts in the previous table as the Government does not define the engines as “military” products; in fact, most (but not all) of the Bell 412 helicopters end up in military use in Indonesia.

Source: Canadian Military Industry Database Report, June 7, 1994, Project Ploughshares, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario.

## **Appendix Two**

**Map of Indonesia from Special Issue on Indonesia  
of the Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 1993**

### Appendix Three

#### Official Canadian Military Exports to Israel 1978-1992

DATES	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT (\$)
1978	Annual Total	3,296,840
1979	Annual Total	1,373,044
1980	Annual Total	2,963,549
1981	Annual Total	2,244,122
1982	Annual Total	3,233,862
1983	Annual Total	4,683,966
1984	Annual Total	5,069,441
1985	Annual Total	6,363,018
1986	Annual Total	2,257,002
1987	Annual Total	13,900,000
1988	Annual Total	12,900
1989	Vehicle navigational attitude reference system for LLAD system	82,056
1990	Military vehicles and computers Fire control system and sub-system	50,128 13,831
1991	Vehicles for military use, computers and software Fire control system and sub-system, computers, access and software	12,057 11,400
1992	Nothing Reported	--

Note: See "Note" accompanying equivalent table in Appendix One.

Source: Canadian Military Industry Database Report, June 3, 1994, Project Ploughshares, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario.



### Discovered Details of Canadian Military Exports to Israel

DATE	COMPANY	DESCRIPTION OF CONTRACT	AMOUNT (\$)
1981	Control Data Canada Ltd. (Ont.)	Computer equipment (subc)	939,700
1983	Control Data Canada Ltd. (Ont.)	Computer-assisted design and manufacturing system (subc)	1,000,000
1986	Litton Systems Canada Ltd. (Ont.)	AN/APS-504 radar for IAI 1124N Sea Scan aircraft	?
1990	Computing Devices Canada ltd. (Ont.)	Servicing of fire control system	13,831
1991	CAE Electronics Ltd. (Que.)	Integrated machinery control system for Saar 5 missile corvettes (subc)	?

Note: "Discovered" details were found in news media reports and other secondary sources.

Source: Canadian Military Industry Database Report, June 3, 1994, Project Ploughshares, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario.

**Appendix Four**  
**Coverage of East Timor in the *Globe and Mail* 1970-1994**

YEAR	ARTICLES ABOUT E. TIMOR	ARTICLES MENTIONING E. TIMOR IN PASSING	EDITORIALS	LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
1970	1			
1975				
Feb.:	1			
Aug.-Sept.:	21	1		
Oct.-Dec. 6:	5	1		
Dec. 7-31:	7			
1976	7			
1977	1			
1978	1			
1979	3			
1980	3	1		1
1981	2	3		
1982	3	5		1
1983	5	5		
1984	2	6		10
1985	2	3		2
1986	1	3		
1987	1	3	1	8
1988	2	4		3
1989	8	2		9
1990	3	4		5
1991	12 (12 Dili)	12 (12 Dili)		4 (3 Dili)
1992	13	13	1	7
1993	3	7		1

1994 Jan.-June				
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Sources: (1) Library of the *Globe and Mail*; (2) InfoGlobe searches by the author and by Sharon Scharfe (see Scharfe, 1994: 109). "Dili" refers to the Dili or Santa Cruz Massacre of November 12, 1991.

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